

Detecting Anomalies


Andreas Zeller



What's abnormal?

- Suppose we determine common properties of all *passing* runs.
- Now we examine a run which *fails* the test.
- Any difference in properties *correlates with failure* – and is likely to hint at failure causes

Detecting Anomalies



Properties

Data properties that hold in all runs:

- “At $f()$, x is odd”
- “ $0 \leq x \leq 10$ during the run”

Code properties that hold in all runs:

- “ $f()$ is always executed”
- “After $open()$, we eventually have $close()$ ”

Techniques

Dynamic
Invariants

Value
Ranges

Sampled
Values

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
Sampled
Values

Dynamic Invariants



Invariant

At $f()$, x is odd



Property

At $f()$, $x = 2$

Daikon

- Determines *invariants* from program runs
- Written by Michael Ernst et al. (1998–)
- C++, Java, Lisp, and other languages
- analyzed up to 13,000 lines of code

Daikon

```
public int ex1511(int[] b, int n)
{
    int s = 0;
    int i = 0;
    while (i != n) {
        s = s + b[i];
        i = i + 1;
    }
    return s;
}
```

Precondition


```
n == size(b[])
b != null
n <= 13
n >= 7
```

Postcondition


```
b[] = orig(b[])
return == sum(b)
```

- Run with 100 randomly generated arrays of length 7–13

Daikon




Getting the Trace



- Records all variable values at all function entries and exits
- Uses VALGRIND to create the trace

Filtering Invariants

- Daikon has a library of *invariant patterns* over variables and constants
- Only matching patterns are preserved



Method Specifications

using *primitive data*

$x = 6$	$x \in \{2, 5, -30\}$	$x < y$
$y = 5x + 10$	$z = 4x + 12y + 3$	$z = \text{fn}(x, y)$

using *composite data*

A subseq B	$x \in A$	sorted(A)
------------	-----------	-----------

checked at method entry + exit

Object Invariants

```
string.content[string.length] = '\0'
```

```
node.left.value ≤ node.right.value
```

```
this.next.last = this
```

checked at entry + exit of public methods

Matching Invariants

```
public int ex1511(int[] b, int n)
{
    int s = 0;
    int i = 0;
    while (i != n) {
        s = s + b[i];
        i = i + 1;
    }
    return s;
}
```

A == B

Pattern

s size(b[])
sum(b[]) n
orig(n)
return ...

Variables


Matching Invariants

==	s	n	size (b[])	sum (b[])	orig (n)	ret
s		X			X	
n	X			X		X
size(b[])						
sum(b[])		X				
orig(n)	X					X
ret		X			X	

run 1

A == B

Pattern



Variables


Matching Invariants

==	s	n	size (b[])	sum (b[])	orig (n)	ret
s		X	X		X	
n	X			X	X	X
size(b[])	X			X		X
sum(b[])		X	X		X	
orig(n)	X	X		X		X
ret		X	X		X	

run 2

A == B

Pattern



Variables


Matching Invariants

==	s	n	size (b[])	sum (b[])	orig (n)	ret
s		X	X		X	
n	X			X	X	X
size(b[])	X			X		X
sum(b[])		X	X		X	
orig(n)	X	X		X		X
ret		X	X		X	

run 3

A == B

Pattern



Variables

Matching Invariants

==	s	n	size (b[])	sum (b[])	orig (n)	ret
s		X	X		X	
n	X			X	X	X
size(b[])	X			X		X
sum(b[])		X	X		X	
orig(n)	X	X		X		X
ret		X	X		X	

$s == \text{sum}(b[])$

$s == \text{ret}$

$n == \text{size}(b[])$

$\text{ret} == \text{sum}(b[])$

Matching Invariants

```
public int ex1511(int[] b, int n)
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        i = i + 1;
    }
    return s;
}
```

$s == \text{sum}(b[])$

$s == \text{ret}$

$n == \text{size}(b[])$

$\text{ret} == \text{sum}(b[])$

Enhancing Relevance

- Handle polymorphic variables
- Check for derived values
- Eliminate redundant invariants
- Set statistical threshold for relevance
- Verify correctness with static analysis

Daikon Discussed

- As long as some property can be observed, it can be added as a pattern
- Pattern vocabulary determines the invariants that can be found (“sum()”, etc.)
- Checking all patterns (and combinations!) is expensive
- Trivial invariants must be eliminated


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Dynamic Invariants



Diduce


- Determines *invariants* and *violations*
- Written by Sudheendra Hangal and Monica Lam (2001)
- Java bytecode
- analyzed > 30,000 lines of code

Diduce



Invariant

Training mode



Property

Checking mode

Training Mode



- Start with empty set of invariants
- Adjust invariants according to values found during run

Invariant

Invariants in Diduce

For each variable, Diduce has a pair (V, M)

- $V = \text{initial value}$ of variable
- $M = \text{range of values}$: i -th bit of M is cleared if value change in i -th bit was observed
- With each assignment of a new value W , M is updated to $M := M \wedge \neg (W \otimes V)$
- *Differences* are stored in same format

Training Example

Code	i	Values		Differences		Invariant
		V	M	V	M	
$i = 10$	1010	1010	1111	—	—	$i = 10$
$i += 1$	1011	1010	1110	0001	1111	$10 \leq i \leq 11 \wedge i' - i = 1$
$i += 1$	1100	1010	1000	0001	1111	$8 \leq i \leq 15 \wedge i' - i = 1$
$i += 1$	1101	1010	1000	0001	1111	$8 \leq i \leq 15 \wedge i' - i = 1$
$i += 2$	1111	1010	1000	0001	1101	$8 \leq i \leq 15 \wedge i' - i \leq 2$

During *checking*, clearing an M-bit is an anomaly

Diduce vs. Daikon

- Less space and time requirements
- Invariants are computed on the fly
- Smaller set of invariants
- Less precise invariants


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Detecting Anomalies



Liblit's Sampling

- We want properties of runs in the field
- Collecting all this data is too expensive
- Would a *sample* suffice?
- Sampling experiment by Liblit et al. (2003)


Return Values

- Hypothesis: *function return values* correlate with failure or success
- Classified into positive / zero / negative


CCRYPT fails

- CCRYPT is an interactive encryption tool
- When CCRYPT asks user for information before overwriting a file, and user responds with EOF, CCRYPT crashes
- 3,000 random runs
- Of 1,170 predicates, only `file_exists() > 0` and `xreadline() == 0` correlate with failure

Liblit's Sampling



- Can we apply this technique to remote runs, too?
- 1 out of 1000 return values was sampled
- Performance loss <4%



Web Services

- Sampling is first choice for web services
- Have 1 out of 100 users run an instrumented version of the web service
- Correlate instrumentation data with failure
- After sufficient number of runs, we can automatically identify the anomaly

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
Sampled
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Anomalies and Causes

- An anomaly is not a cause, but a correlation
- Although correlation \neq causation, anomalies can be excellent hints
- Future belongs to those who exploit
 - Correlations in *multiple runs*
 - Causation in *experiments*

Locating Defects

- NN (Renieris + Reiss, ASE 2003)
- CT (Cleve + Zeller, ICSE 2005)
- SD (Liblit et al., PLDI 2005)
- SOBER (Liu et al, ESEC 2005)



Concepts

- ★ Comparing data abstractions shows anomalies correlated with failure
- ★ Variety of abstractions and implementations
- ★ Anomalies can be excellent hints
- ★ Future: Integration of anomalies + causes

